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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Brummett appeals from the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Union Pacific railroad tracks near 11 th Avenue North, Nampa are
protected by a chainlink fence with barbed wire on top.

(R., Vol. II, p. 172

(7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-20).) Union Pacific also posted a large no trespassing
sign. (Id.) Officer Davis saw Brummett walking on the railroad tracks. (R., Vol. I,
p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172.) Brummett was wearing headphones. (R., Vol. II, p.
172 (7 /10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 21 - p. 7, L. 6).) Officer Davis repeatedly yelled to get
Brummett's attention, but he ignored Officer Davis. (Id.)
Only after Officer Davis raised his voice as loud as he could, did
Brummett walk over to the chain link fence to talk to Officer Davis. (Id.) Officer
Davis told Brummett that he was on private property and he needed Brummett to
come down to where Brummett could cross the fence and they could talk. (R.,
Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 7, L. 7 - p. 8, L. 12).) Brummett eventually started
walking in the direction Officer Davis indicated. (Id.)
Brummett then walked out into the middle of the tracks and just stopped.
(Id.)

Officer Davis kept yelling at him, but Brummett just ignored him.

(Id.)

Officer Davis started to climb over the fence. (R., Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p.
8, Ls. 3-12).) Brummett took off running. (Id.) Brummett ran towards a slow
moving train and climbed through the middle of two railroad cars. (R., Vol. I, p.
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27.) The train stopped just in time for Officer Davis to go through the same two
railroad cars. (Id.) Brummett continued to run, but eventually tripped and fell.
(Id.) He got up and refused Officer Davis' commands to get on the ground. (Id.)
Officer Davis tackled Brummett and put him in handcuffs. (Id.) During a brief
pat-down, Officer Davis found marijuana in Brummett's left front pants pocket.
(R., Vol. I, pp. 27-28.) Before Officer Davis put Brummett in the patrol car he
also found a hypodermic needle in his jacket pocket and a spoon with white
crystal residue. (R., Vol. I, p. 28; Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L.
8).) The white crystal residue tested positive for methamphetamine. (R., Vol. I,
p. 28; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L. 8).)
After Brummett was advised of his Miranda rights, Brummett admitted that
the methamphetamine and marijuana were his. (R., Vol. II, p. 107.) Brummett
said he ran from Officer Davis because he thought Officer Davis would search
him and find the marijuana. (Id.) Union Pacific Rail Road advised Officer Davis
that Brummett would have had to climb the fence to get onto their railroad tracks
at that location. (Id.)
methamphetamine,

The state charged Brummett with possession of

trespass,

possession

of paraphernalia,

resisting

and

obstructing and possession of marijuana. (R., Vol. II, pp. 106, 134-136.)
After a preliminary hearing, Brummett was bound over to district court.
(R., Vol. 11, pp. 167, 170-178.)

The state added a Persistent Violator

enchantment. (R., Vol. II, pp. 184-185.) Brummett's counsel sent him a letter
explaining that a motion to suppress was not warranted because Brummett ran
from police.

(R., Vol. I, p. 37.)

Brummett's counsel provided Brummett with
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copies of the police report and applicable case law. (Id.) The letter also urged
Brummett to consider the state's plea offer, because the state offered to dismiss
the persistent violator enhancement. (Id.) Brummett's counsel also sent him a
second letter explaining that he would not file a motion to dismiss because such
a motion would be frivolous. (R., Vol. I, p. 35.)
Brummett

agreed

methamphetamine.
state

dismissed

to

plead

guilty

to

felony

possession

of

(R., Vol. II, p. 197.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the
the

misdemeanors

-

trespass,

resist

and

obstruct,

paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana - and dismissed the persistent
violator enhancement.

(R., Vol. II, pp. 202-207.) The district court sentenced

Brummett to seven years with three years fixed. (R., Vol. II, pp. 208-210.) The
district court ordered the sentence to run concurrent with Brummett's Ada County
sentence. (Id.)
Brummett filed a Petition and Affidavit For Post Conviction Relief.

(R.,

Vol. I, pp. 3-55.) The district court appointed post-conviction counsel. (R., Vol.
I, pp. 62-64, 97-98.) The state filed an Answer. (R., Vol. I, pp. 71-73.)
The district court entered an Order of Conditional Dismissal. (R., Vol. II,
p. 265-274.) The Order of Conditional Dismissal gave Brummett notice of the
court's intent to dismiss and provided its reasons for the dismissal. (See R., Vol.
II, pp. 265-27 4.)

In part, the district court gave notice that Brummett failed to

provide admissible evidence that his counsel was ineffective for declining to file a
motion to suppress based upon the claim that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion that Brummett was trespassing. (R., Vol. II, pp. 271-272.) The district
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court gave Brummett 20 days to respond. (R., Vol. II, p. 273.) Brummett moved
for additional time to respond and the district court granted the motion. (R., Vol.
II, pp. 275-278.)
Dismissal.

Brummett filed an Objection to the Order of Conditional

(R., Vol. II, pp. 279-284.)

Brummett argued that he was not

trespassing because there was an opening in the fence and he did not see the
no trespassing signs. (R., Vol. II, p. 283.)
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order of
Dismissal.

(R., Vol. II, pp. 285-289.)

The district court rejected Brummett's

argument and held that Officer Davis "had a reasonable suspicion that
[Brummett] was committing criminal activity, particularly when [Brummett] ran
from police." (R., Vol. II, pp. 287-288.) The district court also found that that
motion to suppress would have been denied because the officer "acted
reasonably within his community caretaking function to make sure that
[Brummett] was off of the railroad tracks because trains frequently pass along
the same tracks that [Brummett] was walking on."

(R., Vol. II, p. 288.)

In

conclusion the district court held:
This Court finds that [Brummett's] claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel fails because there was no showing that his attorney's
performance was deficient and because [Brummett] cannot show a
reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would likely have
succeeded, thus counsel's failure to pursue the motion was not
prejudicial to [Brummett's] case.
(R., Vol. II, p. 288.)

The district court dismissed Brummett's post-conviction

petition. (R., Vol. II, p. 290.) Brummett timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp. 292295.)
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ISSUE
Brummett states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Brummett's
petition without giving notice as required by I.C. § 19-4906(b)?
2.
Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of
counsel because the community caretaker exception to the Fourth
Amendment allows police to chase, tackle, arrest, and search a person
who, while near railroad tracks, is on a public street and in no apparent
danger of being injured by a train or anything else and presents no threat
to safe railroad operations? U.S. Const. Amends 4, 6, and 14; Idaho
Const. Art. I, §17.
3.
Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of
counsel because the fact that he ran from the police, with nothing more,
was sufficient to justify tackling, arresting and searching him? U.S. Const.
Amends 4, 6, and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, §17
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
1. Has Brummett failed to show the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his post-conviction petition?

5

ARGUMENT
Brummett Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Summarily
Dismissed His Post-Conviction Petition

A

Introduction
On appeal Brummett argues the district court failed to give adequate

notice of the reasons for the summary dismissal.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.)

Specifically, Brummett argues that the district court did not give him adequate
notice of the "community caretaking" reason for dismissal. (Id.) However, the
primary reason the district court dismissed his petition was that a motion to
suppress would have failed because Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion to
believe Brummett was engaged in criminal activity. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 265-274,
285-289.) Brummett does not challenge this notice.
Brummett also argues that his criminal counsel was ineffective for
declining to file a motion to suppress challenging Officer Davis' reasonable
articulable suspicion for the stop.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-12.)

Brummett is

incorrect. Brummett's criminal counsel was not ineffective for declining to file a
motion to suppress because a motion to suppress would not have been
successful.

Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion to stop Brummett and

probable cause to arrest Brummett for trespass and resisting and obstructing.
(See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 1 - p. 8, L. 12).)
Any motion to suppress would have failed and, therefore the district court did not
err when it dismissed Brummett's post-conviction petition.
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8.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

The District Provided Proper Notice Of Its Intention To Dismiss
Brummett's Petition
Brummett claims that the district court dismissed his petition without

providing him proper notice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b).)
"When

the

court

considering

the

petition

for

post-conviction

relief

is

contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State,
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted); see also I.C. §
19-4906(b). The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to
give the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418,
825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 P.2d
676, 678 (1981).
Brummett argues that since the "community caretaking" reasoning was
not discussed in the Conditional Notice of Dismissal, but was used in the
Memorandum Decision and Order of Dismissal, he was not given proper notice.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.)

While the district court's order did discuss the
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community caretaking function, the district court's dismissal was primarily based
on the finding that Officer Davis had reasonable articulable suspicion that
Brummett was trespassing and Brummett's counsel was not ineffective for
refusing to file a motion to suppress.

(R., Vol. II, pp. 287-288.)

In the

Memorandum Decision and Order of Dismissal the district court wrote:
Based on these facts, this Court finds that the arresting officer had
a reasonable suspicion that petitioner was committing criminal
activity, particularly when the defendant ran from police.
(R., Vol. II, p. 288.)

The district court's Order of Conditional Dismissal gave

Brummett notice of the court's intention to dismiss because the officer had
reason to believe Brummett was trespassing.

(See R., Vol. II, pp. 265-274.)

Brummett does not claim that he was given inadequate notice regarding this
basis for dismissal. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) Therefore, the district court
gave Brummett adequate notice of the reason for the dismissal of his petition.
Even if the notice regarding community caretaking was inadequate, it was
harmless.

If a petitioner is "not left with an 'invisible target' and is able to

respond in a meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss,"
then any lack of adequate notice is harmless.

Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411,

422-423, 128 P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Franck-Teel v. State,
143 Idaho 664, 671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevertheless, if FranckTeel's response to the state's motion for summary dismissal reveals that she
understood the basis for dismissal. .. , then we will conclude that the inadequacy
of notice was harmless error.").

Brummett understood the basis for the

dismissal. Brummett's objection attempted to address whether Officer Davis had
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reasonable suspicion that Brummett was trespassing. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 279284.) This was the primary basis for the dismissal. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 285289.) There was no invisible target and any inadequate notice was harmless.

D.

Brummett Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Dismissed His
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim
The district court summarily dismissed Brummett's petition for post-

conviction relief because Brummett failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact. (R., Vol. II, pp. 265-274, 285-289.) "Idaho Code§ 19-4906 permits a court
to rule summarily on applications for post-conviction relief."

Workman, 144

Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. "A court may grant the motion of either party
under I.C. § 19-4906(c), or may dismiss the application sua sponte under I.C. §
19-4906(b)."

kl

Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition "is

appropriate if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact."

kl at 522,

164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),(c)). "To withstand summary

dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a
prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant
bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278,
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,583, 6 P.3d 831,833 (2000)). In
order to survive summary dismissal of a claim alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, the petitioner "must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as
to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case." Schoger v.
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State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
"In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to
pursue a motion in the underlying criminal action, the court properly may
consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining
whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Boman
v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Huck v.
State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "Where the
alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test."
at 158, 857 P.2d at 637).

kl

(citing Huck, 124 Idaho

"If the motion lacked merit and would have been

denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for failing to pursue it, and,
concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the want of its
pursuit." Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-159, 857 P.2d at 637-638.
Brummett argues that his criminal counsel was ineffective because he did
not file a motion to suppress. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) He argues that a motion
to suppress would have likely been granted because there was no reasonable
articulable suspicion that Brummett was engaged in criminal activity. (R., Vol. I,
p. 11-12.) Brummett is incorrect.
Brummett was not seized and his Fourth Amendment rights were not
implicated until Officer Davis physically seized Brummett and placed him under
arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (pursuit by police
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did not constitute a seizure and defendant was not seized until he was tackled);
State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 590-591, 903 P.2d 752, 755-756 (Ct. App.
1995). A mere show of authority, where the subject does not submit, does not
constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Agundis, 127
Idaho at 590-591, 903 P.2d at 755-756 (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S.at 625).
Where the subject does not submit, the officer's orders to stop do not constitute
a seizure and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
submit to Officer Davis' verbal instructions.

lsL.

Brummett did not

Brummett was not seized until

Officer Davis tacked Brummett and placed Brummett under arrest. (See R., Vol.
II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 13-17).)
At the time Officer Davis tackled Brummett, Officer Davis had reasonable
suspicion to stop Brummett and probable cause to arrest Brummett.

An

investigatory stop "is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity."

State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 181, 244

P.3d 1261, 1267 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003)). Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion
to conduct an investigatory seizure is determined by the totality of the
circumstances.

State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522

(1992). "Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability."
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). "Reasonable or probable cause is
the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and
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prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such
person is guilty."

State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062

(1996) (citation omitted). "Probable cause is not measured by the same level of
proof required for conviction."

kl

Probable cause deals with "the factual and

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
[persons], not legal technicians, act."

kl (citations omitted.)

At the time Officer Davis tackled Brummett Officer Davis had reasonable
suspicion and probable cause to believe that Brummett committed the crimes of
trespass and resisting and obstructing.

Officer Davis observed Brummett

walking on railroad tracks protected by a chain linked, barbed wire fence and
labeled no trespassing. (See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr.,
p. 6, L. 1 - p. 8, L. 12).)
Q.

And when you arrived what did you see?

A.
I observed the defendant, Mr. Brummett walking
along the railroad tracks, eastbound. He was on the other
side of a chain linked, barbed wire fence, walking towards
th
the train station from 11 Avenue North. Or 11 th Avenue it
kind goes from north to south right there.
Q.

Are there any sort of no trespassing signs in that

area?

A.
On the opposite side there is. The - have observed a
large no trespassing sign on the east side of 11 th Avenue.
Q.

How about anything on the west side of 11 th Avenue?

A.
I can't honestly say that there's no trespassing signs
but the chain linked fence and the barbed wire kind of tell
the story.

12

(R., Vol. 11, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-20).) In 2008, the applicable portion of

the trespass statute stated:
A. Every person who willfully commits any trespass, by either:

9. Entering without permission of the owner or the owner's
agent, upon the real property of another person which real
property is posted with "No Trespassing" signs, is posted with
a minimum of one hundred (100) square inches of fluorescent
orange paint except that when metal fence posts are used, the
entire post must be painted fluorescent orange, or other notices of
like meaning, spaced at intervals of not less than one (1) sign, paint
area or notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along such real
property; provided that where the geographical configuration of the
real property is such that entry can reasonably be made only at
certain points of access, such property is posted sufficiently for all
purposes of this section if said signs, paint or notices are posted at
such points of access; or
Is guilty of a misdemeanor
I.C. § 18-7008(9) (2008) (emphasis added). Officer Davis knew the railroad area
where Brummett was walking was marked with a large no trespassing sign and
protected by a chain link and barbwire fence. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 106-108, 172
(7/10/08Tr., p. 6, Ls.1-20).)
This Court can also consider Brummett's flight. Brummett argues that his
flight, by itself, does not rise to the level of reasonable articulable suspicion for a
stop.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120

S.Ct. 673 (2000).) However, flight may be considered as one factor in the totality
of factors to decide reasonable articulable suspicion. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
125 ("Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and
investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his
business or to stay put an remain silent in the face of police questioning"); Padilla
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v. State, _

Idaho_, _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 7263699, *5 (Ct. App. 2014)

(the United States Supreme Court had declined to adopt per se rules regarding
flight, but retained the totality of circumstances analysis when considering
whether reasonable suspicion existed). 1 One "key" factor is whether the flight
occurred upon the defendant noticing the police. Padilla, 2014 WL 7263699 *6
(citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). There is no question that Brummett knew he
was running from police. He ran from Officer Davis after talking to him. (R., Vol.
II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 21 - p. 8, L. 17).) Brummett later explained that
he ran because he did not want the police to find the marijuana in his pocket.
(R., Vol. II, p. 107.)

Brummett argued that he was not trespassing because he did not see any
no trespassing signs and he was able to find an opening in the fence. (R., Vol.
II, pp. 282-283.)

However, for purposes of this reasonable suspicion and

probable cause analysis, whether Brummett saw a no trespassing sign is
irrelevant.

Reasonable suspicion and probable cause is dependent the

information possessed by police, not the information possessed by the
defendant. See White, 496 U.S. at 330; Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at
1223; Julian, 129 Idaho at 136-137, 922 P.2d at 1062-1063.
Officer Davis knew the Union Pacific had placed a large no trespassing
sign, he knew the train tracks were protected by a chainlink and barbed wire
fence, he saw Brummett walking on the train tracks, and he saw Brummett ran

1

The decision in Padilla is not yet final.
pending.
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The state's petition for review is

away from him. (See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 1
- p. 8, L. 12).) Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to
believe that Brummett was trespassing.
Officer Davis also had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to
believe that Brummett committed the crime of resisting and obstructing officers.
Idaho Code§ 18-705 states:

§ 18-705. Resisting and obstructing officers
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public
officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his
office or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer,
when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one (1) year.
I.C. § 18-705. 2 After Officer Davis got Brummett's attention, Brummett refused
to walk to a place where they could talk, ignored Officer Davis instructions and
fled from Officer Davis. (See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr.,
p. 6, L. 1 - p. 8, L. 17).) Officer Davis reasonably believed Brummett willfully
resisted, delayed and obstructed him in the attempted discharge of his duty.
See

~

State v. Quimby, 122 Idaho 389, 391, 834 P.2d 906, 908 (Ct. App.

1992) (defendant's flight from police can provide a basis for probable cause to
arrest for resisting and obstructing). Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest
Brummett for trespassing and resisting and obstructing.

2

Therefore any

The current version of Idaho Code § 18-705 was in effect in 2008 when
Brummett was arrested.
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suppression motion would have failed and the decision to not file such a motion
was not ineffective assistance of counsel. 3

E.

The Search After The Stop Was Not Raised Below And Should Not Be
Considered On Appeal
For the first time on appeal, Brummett argues that Officer Davis' search of

his person was not justified and thus there was no basis for the seizure of
marijuana that resulted in the arrest. (Appellant's brief, p. 12 (citing Hoffman v.
State, 153 Idaho 898, 905, 277 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Ct. App. 2012).) This was not
raised before the district court. (See, R., pp. Vol. II, 267-274, 279-284, 285-289.)
It is well established that issues not raised below may not be considered for the
first time on appeal. See M.:. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d
1061, 1062 (1991 ). This Court should decline to consider this issue not raised
below.
Even if this Court considers the search, Brummett's argument is not
supported by the record. Brummett argues that it was Officer Davis' discovery of
the marijuana which lead to his arrest. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) However, the
probable cause affidavit submitted by Officer Davis stated that he "placed
[Brummett] into custody for Resist and Obstruct." (R., Vol. II, p. 107.) At the

3

As an alternate basis, the district court found that Brummett's detention was
warranted by the police's community caretaking function. (R., Vol. II, pp. 287288 (citing State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004).) Officer
Davis had reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to arrest Brummett
and because this decides the issue on appeal, the state will submit the
community care taking argument on the record below.

16

preliminary hearing, Officer Davis testified that he placed him under arrest before
he did the pat-down.

(See R., Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 13-21).)

Officer Davis' search was justified by several different exceptions, including the
search incident to arrest (for trespass and obstruct and delay) and a Terry
protective search for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State
v. Pedersen, 157 Idaho 790,

, 339 P.3d 1194, 1995-1996 (Ct. App. 2014).

Brummett's new argument is unsupported by the record and law.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 31st day of March 2015.
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